Adaptive reproduction schedule as a cause of worker policing in social hymenoptera: a dynamic game analysis.
Evolutionary theories predict conflicts over sex allocation, male parentage, and reproductive allocation in hymenopteran societies. However, no theory to date has considered the evolution when a colony faces these three conflicts simultaneously. We tackled this issue by developing a dynamic game model, focusing especially on worker policing. Whereas a Nash equilibrium predicts male parentage patterns that are basically the same as those of relatedness-based worker-policing theory (queen multiple mating impedes worker reproduction), we also show the potential for worker policing under queen single mating. Worker policing will depend on the stage of colony growth that is caused by interaction with reproductive allocation conflict or a trade-off between current and future reproduction. Male production at an early stage greatly hinders the growth of the work force and undermines future inclusive fitness of colony members, leading to worker policing at the ergonomic stage. This new mechanism can explain much broader ranges of existing worker-policing behavior than that predicted from relatedness. Predictions differ in many respects from those of models assuming operation of only one or two of the three conflicts, suggesting the importance of interactions among conflicts.
Department of Value and Decision Science, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Tokyo 152-8552, Japan. ohtsuki.h.aa@m.titech.ac.jp
Hisashi
H
Ohtsuki
Kazuki
K
Tsuji
D000220:Adaptation, Biological; D000818:Animals; D005075:Biological Evolution; D005260:Female; D005298:Fertility; D005716:Game Theory; D006927:Hymenoptera; D008297:Male; D008954:Models, Biological; D052287:Oviparity; D011157:Population Dynamics; D012919:Social Behavior