An independent, empirical route to nonconceptual content.
The overall goal of this paper is to offer an independent, empirical route to characterize the content on nonconceptual content. I pursue a recent move by Pylyshyn, a leading cognitive scientist and philosopher of mental representation, who focuses on empirical considerations in favor of nonconceptual representations. Pylyshyn proposes a minimalist view of nonconceptual representations. I offer empirical reasons that force us to go beyond minimalist account and reinstate empirically defensible richer nonconceptual representations into a theory of content.
Chadha
Monima
M
School of Philosophy and Bioethics, Monash University, Clayton Campus, P.O. Box 11A, Victoria 3800, Australia. Monima.Chadha@arts.monash.edu.au
D001288:Attention; D001364:Awareness; D019336:Cognitive Science; D003118:Color Perception; D003210:Concept Formation; D004192:Discrimination, Psychological; D019348:Empiricism; D006801:Humans; D010364:Pattern Recognition, Visual; D010684:Philosophy; D011582:Psychological Theory; D021641:Recognition, Psychology; D012858:Size Perception