Self-regulation and the hypothesis of experience-based selection: investigating indirect conscious control.
The assumption that the contents of our conscious visual experience directly control our fine-tuned, real-time motor activity has been challenged by neurological and psychophysical evidence that suggest the two processes work semi-independently of each other. Clark [Clark, A. (2001). Visual experience and motor action: Are the bonds too tight? The Philosophical Review, 110, 495-519; Clark, A. (2002). Is seeing all it seems? Action, reason and the grand illusion. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9, 181-202; Clark, A. (2006). Vision as dance? Three challenges for sensori-motor contingency theory. PSYCHE, 12 (1). Available from http://www.psyche.cs.monash.edu.au] argues that such evidence implies a more indirect relationship between conscious visual experience and motor-control where the function of visual consciousness is not to control action but to select what actions are to be controlled. In this paper, I argue that this type of dynamic also exists at the wider level of self-regulation where conscious intent appears to indirectly control the enactment of the intended behaviour. I argue that by drawing parallels between Clark's proposed dynamic and self-regulation, the former is not only bolstered by a previously unrecognised source of support but our understanding of the latter can help to further elucidate Clark's proposed mechanism of indirect conscious control.
Department of Applied Psychology, University College Cork, Cork Enterprise Centre, North Mall, Cork, Ireland. d.dorris@ucc.ie
Derek C
DC
Dorris
D001364:Awareness; D003210:Concept Formation; D003243:Consciousness; D006801:Humans; D033182:Intention; D008568:Memory; D011597:Psychomotor Performance; D014796:Visual Perception