Dual lattice model of the evolution of facultative symbiosis with continuous Prisoner's Dilemma game.
Mutualism is ubiquitous in nature and is thought to have played a key role in the history of life. However, how mutualism could evolve despite being prone to unilateral exploitation is a puzzling question in evolutionary ecology. Some theoretical studies have shown that spatial structure of habitat can facilitate the emergence and maintenance of mutualism. However, they are based on the simple assumption that the trait in question is discrete: each individual is either a mutualist or a non-mutualist. In this article I develop a simple simulation model of coevolution of facultative symbiosis using a one-shot continuous Prisoner's Dilemma game to investigate the evolutionary dynamics of mutualism between two species. In this model I assume continuous traits for both species from -1 (fully deceptive) to 1 (fully cooperative). The habitat has a dual-lattice structure, each layer is inhabited by one species. Interspecific interaction is restricted between two corresponding sites of the two layers. Without limitation on the magnitude of a single mutation, I find that mutualism can arise and persist when the intrinsic reproduction rate is low (but is above a threshold) and the benefit/cost ratio of the cooperative strategy is large, which is consistent with Yamamura et al. [2004. Evolution of mutualism through spatial effects. J. Theor. Biol. 226, 421-428]. In these cases, extreme antagonism often evolves starting from a neutral population that seems nearly stable, but once mutualism arises, the cooperative individuals quickly increase and both the populations eventually become mutualistic on average, although they are polymorphic. However, when the effect of a single mutation was limited to be small, extreme antagonism is much likely to dominate unless the intrinsic reproduction rate is low. When only one species is allowed to evolve, mutualism arises when the initial strategy of the other species is cooperative. Otherwise, excessive deception evolves in the former, and the latter often becomes driven to extinction.
Ezoe
Hideo
H
Department of Biological Science, Graduate School of Science, Osaka Prefecture University, Sakai, Osaka 599-8531, Japan. hezoe@b.s.osakafu-u.ac.jp
D000818:Animals; D005075:Biological Evolution; D003198:Computer Simulation; D003299:Cooperative Behavior; D005716:Game Theory; D008957:Models, Genetic; D009154:Mutation; D013559:Symbiosis / Q000235:genetics*