Dilemma game structure observed in traffic flow at a 2-to-1 lane junction.
Using a cellular automaton traffic model based on the stochastic optimal velocity model with appropriate assumptions for both incoming and outgoing vehicle boundaries, the so-called bottleneck issue on a lane-closing section was investigated in terms of game theory. In the system, two classified driver agents coexist: C agents (cooperative strategy) always driving in the first lane and D agents (defective strategy) trying to drive in a lower-density lane whether the first or the second lane. In high-density flow, D agents' interruption into the first lane from the second just before the lane-closing section creates a heavier traffic jam, which reduces social efficiency. This particular event can be described with a prisoner's dilemma game structure.
Yamauchi
Atsuo
A
Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan. es208181@s.kyushu-u.ac.jp
Tanimoto
Jun
J
Hagishima
Aya
A
Sagara
Hiroki
H