Social structure of primate interaction networks facilitates the emergence of cooperation.
Animal cooperation has puzzled biologists for a long time as its existence seems to contravene the basic notion of evolutionary biology that natural selection favours 'selfish' genes that promote only their own well-being. Evolutionary game theory has shown that cooperators can prosper in populations of selfish individuals if they occur in clusters, interacting more frequently with each other than with the selfish. Here we show that social networks of primates possess the necessary social structure to promote the emergence of cooperation. By simulating evolutionary dynamics of cooperative behaviour on interaction networks of 70 primate groups, we found that for most groups network reciprocity augmented the fixation probability for cooperation. The variation in the strength of this effect can be partly explained by the groups' community modularity-a network measure for the groups' heterogeneity. Thus, given selective update and partner choice mechanisms, network reciprocity has the potential to explain socially learned forms of cooperation in primate societies.
Voelkl
Bernhard
B
Departement Ecologie, Physiologie et Ethologie, IPHC, CNRS, Strasbourg, France. bernhard.voelkl@c-strasbourg.fr
Kasper
Claudia
C
D000465:Algorithms; D000818:Animals; D001522:Behavior, Animal; D005075:Biological Evolution; D019058:Community Networks; D003198:Computer Simulation; D003299:Cooperative Behavior; D005716:Game Theory; D008954:Models, Biological; D011157:Population Dynamics; D011323:Primates / Q000502:physiology*; D013045:Species Specificity