title: The ecological level of analysis: can neogibsonian principles be applied beyond perception and action?
abstract: Is it useful to apply ecological principles, developed to understand perception and action, in research areas such as social psychology? Charles (Integrative Psychological & Behavioral Sciences 43(1) 53-66 2009) warns ecological psychologists interested in this question that much time and effort can be saved through a backwards extension to or rediscovery of the New Realism tradition. In response, we analyze what ecological psychology risks to lose with such a backwards extension and describe existing extensions of the approach not considered by Charles. According to Charles, New Realism holds that: (1) we experience reality, (2) relations are real, and (3) things are what you see when you see those things. Our arguments originate from a comparison of these principles with six recently described ecological ones: (1) organism-environment systems are the proper units of analysis, (2) environmental realities should be defined at the ecological scale, (3) behavior is emergent and self-organized, (4) perception and action are continuous and cyclic, (5) information is specificational, and (6) perception is of affordances (Richardson et al. 2008).
authors.affiliation: Facultad de Psicología, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Campus de Cantoblanco, 28049, Madrid, Spain. david.travieso@uam.es
authors.forename: David
authors.initials: D
authors.lastname: Travieso
authors.forename: David M
authors.initials: DM
authors.lastname: Jacobs
mesh_terms: D004532:Ego; D004777:Environment; D006801:Humans; D010465:Perception; D011582:Psychological Theory; D011593:Psychology, Social; D012931:Social Environment