title: A mechanism of dynamical interactions for two-person social dilemmas.
abstract: We propose a new mechanism of interactions between game-theoretical agents in which the weights of the connections between interacting individuals are dynamical, payoff-dependent variables. Their evolution depends on the difference between the payoff of the agents from a given type of encounter and their average payoff. The mechanism is studied in the frame of two models: agents distributed on a random graph, and a mean field model. Symmetric and asymmetric connections between the agents are introduced. Long time behavior of both systems is discussed for the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snow Drift games.
authors.affiliation: Department of Mathematics, Informatics and Mechanics, University of Warsaw, Banacha, Poland.
authors.forename: Krzysztof
authors.initials: K
authors.lastname: Mogielski
authors.forename: Tadeusz
authors.initials: T
authors.lastname: Płatkowski
mesh_terms: D005075:Biological Evolution; D003299:Cooperative Behavior; D005716:Game Theory; D006126:Group Processes; D006801:Humans; D008957:Models, Genetic; D008960:Models, Psychological; D012919:Social Behavior