A confusion of tongues between psychoanalysis and philosophy: is the controversy over drive versus relational theory a philosophical one?
In recent years the controversy over Drive versus Relational models of the psyche has become entangled in a philosophical controversy over epistemology. Some have argued that the Drive model was a relic of an age of positivistic science, while Relational models are a product of a postmodern condition. This paper argues that the controversy need not be a philosophical one, and that Relational views are not, in fact, a product of postmodernism, nor are they necessarily dependent on a postmodern epistemology. Separating the epistemological from the psychological more carefully may help return the debate to its proper, psychoanalytic domain, and perhaps contribute to a more fruitful dialogue across what, at times, seems like an abyss between Relational views and Drive theory.
Taub
Gadi
G
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Department of Communications, Mount Scopus, Jerusalem, Israel. gaditaub@zahav.net.il
D004328:Drive; D028781:Ethical Relativism; D006801:Humans; D009769:Object Attachment; D010684:Philosophy; D033302:Postmodernism; D011572:Psychoanalysis; D011574:Psychoanalytic Theory; D011575:Psychoanalytic Therapy