Entry and regulation: evidence from health care professions.
In many countries, pharmacies receive high regulated markups and are protected from competition through geographic entry restrictions. We develop an empirical entry model for pharmacies and physicians with two features: entry restrictions and strategic complementarities. We find that the entry restrictions have directly reduced the number of pharmacies by more than 50%, and also indirectly reduced the number of physicians by about 7%. A removal of the entry restrictions, combined with a reduction in the regulated markups, would generate a large shift in rents to consumers, without reducing the availability of pharmacies. The public interest motivation for the current regime therefore has no empirical support.
Schaumans
Catherine
C
Tilburg University, TILEC. catherine.schaumans@uvt.nl
Verboven
Frank
F
D001530:Belgium; D004465:Economic Competition; D005843:Geography; D033161:Government Regulation; D018166:Health Care Reform; D019981:Health Care Sector; D006801:Humans; D007885:Legislation, Pharmacy; D017059:Models, Econometric; D010594:Pharmacies / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence / Q000592:standards / Q000600:supply & distribution*; D010820:Physicians / Q000191:economics / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence / Q000600:supply & distribution*; D012040:Regional Health Planning