On the supposed moral harm of selecting for deafness.
This paper demonstrates that accounting for the moral harm of selecting for deafness is not as simple or obvious as the widespread negative response from the hearing community would suggest. The central questions addressed by the paper are whether our moral disquiet with regard to selecting for deafness can be adequately defended, and if so, what this might entail. The paper considers several different strategies for accounting for the supposed moral harm of selecting for deafness and concludes that the deaf case cannot be treated in isolation. Accounting for the moral harm of selecting for deafness necessarily entails moral implications for other cases of procreation and procreative decision-making, including unassisted coital reproduction. The lesson to be learned from the deaf case is that we need norms that govern not just the use of reproductive technology, but procreation and procreative decision-making in all of its various forms.
Fahmy
Melissa Seymour
MS
University of Georgia – Philosophy Dept., 107 Peabody Hall, Athens, Georgia 30602, United States. meseymou@uga.edu
D002648:Child; D002669:Child Welfare; D003638:Deafness / Q000235:genetics*; D006801:Humans; D009014:Morals; D046269:Reproductive Rights / Q000941:ethics*; D012641:Selection, Genetic