Children's understanding of second-order mental states.
The most popular topic in theory-of-mind research has been first-order false belief: the realization that it is possible to hold false beliefs about events in the world. A more advanced development is second-order false belief: the realization that it is possible to hold a false belief about someone else's belief. This article reviews research directed to second-order false belief and other forms of higher order, recursive mentalistic reasoning. Three general issues are considered. Research directed to developmental changes indicates that preschoolers typically fail second-order tasks and that success emerges at about age 5 or 6, although results vary some with method of assessment. Research directed to the consequences of second-order competence has revealed positive relations with a number of other aspects of children's development. Finally, measures of both language and executive function relate positively to performance on second-order tasks; the causal bases for the correlations, however, remain to be established. This article concludes with suggestions for future research.
Miller
Scott A
SA
Department of Psychology, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32611, USA. samiller@ufl.edu
D000293:Adolescent; D002648:Child; D002652:Child Behavior / Q000502:physiology; D002657:Child Development / Q000502:physiology*; D002663:Child Language; D002675:Child, Preschool; D003071:Cognition / Q000502:physiology*; D032882:Comprehension / Q000502:physiology*; D003210:Concept Formation / Q000502:physiology*; D008192:Deception; D006801:Humans; D007804:Language Development; D011582:Psychological Theory; D012919:Social Behavior