The morality of harm.
In this article, we discuss the range of concerns people weigh when evaluating the acceptability of harmful actions and propose a new perspective on the relationship between harm and morality. With this aim, we examine Kelly, Stich, Haley, Eng and Fessler's [Kelly, D., Stich, S., Haley, K., Eng, S., & Fessler, D. (2007). Harm, affect, and the moral/conventional distinction. Mind and Language, 22, 117-131] recent claim that, contrary to Turiel and associates, people do not judge harm to be authority independent and general in scope in the context of complex harmful scenarios (e.g., prisoner interrogation, military training). In a modified replication of their study, we examined participants' judgments of harmful actions in these contexts by taking into account their explanations for their judgments. We claim that both in terms of participants' judgments and rationales, the results largely confirm our hypothesis that actions involving harm andinjustice or rights violation are judged to be authority independent and general in scope, which is a modification of Turiel's traditional hypothesis.
Sousa
Paulo
P
Institute of Cognition and Culture, Queen's University, Belfast, 2-4 Fitzwilliam Street, BT71NN Belfast, UK. psousa@qub.ac.uk
Holbrook
Colin
C
Piazza
Jared
J
D000293:Adolescent; D000328:Adult; D003657:Decision Making / Q000502:physiology*; D006801:Humans; D033182:Intention; D007600:Judgment / Q000502:physiology*; D009014:Morals; D009042:Motivation; D010146:Pain; D012938:Social Perception; D012945:Social Values