Defining personal loss after severe brain damage.
The impact of disorders of consciousness in terms of compensation for patients' personal non-economic injuries often raises vigorous debates in legal courts. Attributing personal loss to non-communicating brain damaged patients based on assessment of residual levels of consciousness remains controversial. Is the loss of consciousness in vegetative or minimally conscious state a condition to be compensated for? Does alteration of consciousness diminish the seriousness of injury? To answer these challenging medico-legal questions, three distinct aspects are here taken into consideration: (i) the recognition that disorders of consciousness constitute a personal injury for non-communicative patients; (ii) the scope of the compensation for this injury and (iii) the purpose of the compensation granted.
Lutte
Isabelle
I
Medico-legal Department, Faculty of Medicine, Université Libre de Bruxelles and Coma Science Group, Cyclotron Research Centre, University of Liège, Belgium. ilutte@thelius.be
D001930:Brain Injuries / Q000150:complications*; D003243:Consciousness / Q000502:physiology*; D003244:Consciousness Disorders / Q000191:economics / Q000209:etiology / Q000523:psychology; D004185:Disability Evaluation; D006801:Humans; D010559:Personnel Management / Q000191:economics / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence; D021641:Recognition, Psychology; D012649:Self Concept; D014942:Workers' Compensation / Q000191:economics / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence