A litmus test for exploitation: James Stacey Taylor's stakes and kidneys.
James Stacy Taylor advances a thorough argument for the legalization of markets in current (live) human kidneys. The market is seemly the most abhorrent type of market, a market where the least well-off sell part of their body to the most well off. Though rigorously defended overall, his arguments concerning exploitation are thin. I examine a number of prominent bioethicists' account of exploitation: most importantly, Ruth Sample's exploitation as degradation. I do so in the context of Taylor's argument, with the aim of buttressing Taylor's position that a regulated kidney market is morally allowable. I argue that Sample fails to provide normative grounds consistent with her claim that exploitation is wrong. I then reformulate her account for consistency and plausibility. Still, this seemingly more plausible view does not show that Taylor's regulated kidney market is prohibitively exploitative of impoverished persons. I tack into place one more piece of support for Taylor's conclusion. (wc. 148).
Kuntz
J R
JR
The University of Edinburgh, UK. j.r.kuntz@sms.ed.ac.uk
D003068:Coercion; D003132:Commerce / Q000941:ethics*; D035881:Compensation and Redress / Q000941:ethics*; D006801:Humans; D038622:Internationality; D016030:Kidney Transplantation / Q000191:economics*; D019520:Living Donors / Q000941:ethics*; D026684:Personal Autonomy; D011049:Social Control Policies; D012935:Social Justice; D009927:Tissue and Organ Procurement / Q000191:economics / Q000941:ethics*; D026712:Value of Life