Fleck and the social constitution of scientific objectivity.
Ludwik Fleck's theory of thought-styles has been hailed as a pioneer of constructivist science studies and sociology of scientific knowledge. But this consensus ignores an important feature of Fleck's epistemology. At the core of his account is the ideal of 'objective truth, clarity, and accuracy'. I begin with Fleck's account of modern natural science, locating the ideal of scientific objectivity within his general social epistemology. I then draw on Fleck's view of scientific objectivity to improve upon reflexive accounts of the origin and development of the theory of thought-styles, and reply to objections that Fleck's epistemological stance is self-undermining or inconsistent. Explicating the role of scientific objectivity in Fleck's epistemology reveals his view to be an internally consistent alternative to recent social accounts of scientific objectivity by Harding, Daston and Galison. I use these contrasts to indicate the strengths and weaknesses of Fleck's innovative social epistemology, and propose modifications to address the latter. The result is a renewed version of Fleck's social epistemology, which reconciles commitment to scientific objectivity with integrated sociology, history and philosophy of science.
Fagan
Melinda B
MB
Department of Philosophy, Rice University, MS 14, PO Box 1892, Houston, Texas 77251-1892, USA. mbf2@rice.edu
D015982:Bias; D049673:History, 20th Century; D019359:Knowledge; D010684:Philosophy / Q000266:history*; D011044:Poland; D012586:Science / Q000266:history*