Irretrievably confused? Innateness in explanatory context.
The hunt for a biologically respectable definition for the folk concept of innateness is still on. I defend Ariew's Canalization account of innateness against the criticisms of Griffiths and Machery, but highlight the remaining flaws in this proposal. I develop a new analysis based on the notion of environmental induction. A trait is innate, I argue, iff it is not environmentally induced. I augment this definition with a novel analysis of environmental induction that draws on the contrastive nature of causal explanation. Whether a trait is environmentally induced, I argue, depends on a context sensitive contrast class. I argue that a "Noninduction" analysis of innateness allows the concept an explanatory role in biology. I show how my proposal co-opts the successes of the Canalization account whilst avoiding its pitfalls, and I account for why biologists associate a range of disparate properties with innateness.
Birch
Jonathan
J
Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Cambridge, Free School Lane, Cambridge CB23RH, UK. jgb37@cam.ac.uk
D000818:Animals; D003469:Culture; D004777:Environment; D005823:Genetics; D006801:Humans; D007323:Instinct; D019359:Knowledge; D010684:Philosophy