Evolutionary games in wireless networks.
We consider a noncooperative interaction among a large population of mobiles that interfere with each other through many local interactions. The first objective of this paper is to extend the evolutionary game framework to allow an arbitrary number of mobiles that are involved in a local interaction. We allow for interactions between mobiles that are not necessarily reciprocal. We study 1) multiple-access control in a slotted Aloha-based wireless network and 2) power control in wideband code-division multiple-access wireless networks. We define and characterize the equilibrium (called evolutionarily stable strategy) for these games and study the influence of wireless channels and pricing on the evolution of dynamics and the equilibrium.
Tembine
Hamidou
H
Laboratoire Informatique d'Avignon/Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Informatique, University of Avignon, 84911 Avignon Cedex 9, France. tembine@ieee.org
Altman
Eitan
E
El-Azouzi
Rachid
R
Hayel
Yezekael
Y
D000465:Algorithms; D005075:Biological Evolution; D003195:Computer Communication Networks; D003661:Decision Support Techniques; D005716:Game Theory; D008962:Models, Theoretical; D012815:Signal Processing, Computer-Assisted; D059015:Wireless Technology