Undignified bioethics.
The concept of dignity is pervasive in bioethics. However, some bioethicists have argued that it is useless on three grounds: that it is indeterminate; that it is reactionary; and that it is redundant. In response, a number of defences of dignity have recently emerged. All of these defences claim that when dignity is suitably clarified, it can be of great use in helping us tackle bioethical controversies. This paper rejects such defences of dignity. It outlines the four most plausible conceptions of dignity: dignity as virtuous behaviour; dignity as inherent moral worth; Kantian dignity; and dignity as species integrity. It argues that while each conception is coherent, each is also fundamentally flawed. As such, the paper argues for a bioethics without dignity: an 'undignified bioethics.'
Cochrane
Alasdair
A
Centre for the Study of Human Rights, London School of Economics and Political Science, London. A.D.Cochrane@lse.ac.uk
D026688:Bioethical Issues; D001675:Bioethics / Q000639:trends*; D006806:Human Rights; D006808:Humanism; D006801:Humans; D028681:Moral Obligations; D026684:Personal Autonomy; D028723:Personhood; D010684:Philosophy; D028662:Principle-Based Ethics; D028722:Virtues