Dissociating conditional recency in immediate and delayed free recall: a challenge for unitary models of recency.
Temporal distinctiveness models of recency in free recall predict that increasing the delay between the end of sequence and attempting recall of items from that sequence will reduce recency. An empirical dissociation is reported here that violates this prediction when the delay is introduced by the act of recall itself. Analysis of data from a number of previously published free recall studies shows that when the assumed availability of final list items is taken into account, recency increases across the first few output positions in immediate recall despite the delay introduced by recalling items; no such change, with a trend to decreasing recency, is observed in delayed recall. Simulations are presented, showing that 2 models accounting for recency in free recall, the temporal context model (M. W. Howard & M. J. Kahana, 2002) and the SIMPLE model (G. D. A. Brown, I. Neath, & N. Chater, 2007), are unable to account for this novel pattern of data. Further simulations show that the results are consistent with a short-term buffer contributing to recency in immediate free recall and that ordered probing of items may also contribute to this effect; both of these are consistent with the formulation of a short-term buffer akin to models of serial recall.
Farrell
Simon
S
University of Bristol, Bristol BS8 1TU, United Kingdom. Simon.Farrell@bristol.ac.uk
D001244:Association; D001499:Bayes Theorem; D006801:Humans; D011939:Mental Recall / Q000502:physiology*; D008960:Models, Psychological; D013997:Time Factors