Stockpiling anti-viral drugs for a pandemic: the role of Manufacturer Reserve Programs.
To promote stockpiling of anti-viral drugs by non-government organizations such as hospitals, drug manufacturers have introduced Manufacturer Reserve Programs which, for an annual fee, provide the right to buy in the event of a severe outbreak of influenza. We show that these programs enhance drug manufacturer profits but could either increase or decrease the amount of pre-pandemic stockpiling of anti-viral drugs.
Department of Economics, Johns Hopkins University, 3400 N. Charles Street, Baltimore, MD 21218-2685, USA. joe.harrington@jhu.edu <joe.harrington@jhu.edu>
Joseph E
JE
Harrington
Edbert B
EB
Hsu
D000998:Antiviral Agents / Q000191:economics / Q000600:supply & distribution* / Q000627:therapeutic use; D019985:Benchmarking; D004196:Disease Outbreaks; D016527:Drug Costs; D004345:Drug Industry / Q000458:organization & administration; D006801:Humans; D007251:Influenza, Human / Q000188:drug therapy* / Q000453:epidemiology; D007445:Inventories, Hospital / Q000191:economics; D008962:Models, Theoretical; D014481:United States
D000998:Antiviral Agents