A stale challenge to the philosophy of science: commentary on "Is psychology based on a methodological error?" by Michael Schwarz.
In his article "Is psychology based on a methodological error?" and based on a quite convincing empirical basis, Michael Schwarz offers a methodological critique of one of mainstream psychology's key test theoretical axioms, i.e., that of the in principle normal distribution of personality variables. It is characteristic of this paper--and at first seems to be a strength of it--that the author positions his critique within a frame of philosophy of science, particularly positioning himself in the tradition of Karl Popper's critical rationalism. When scrutinizing Schwarz's arguments, however, we find Schwarz's critique profound only as an immanent critique of test theoretical axioms. We raise doubts, however, as to Schwarz's alleged 'challenge' to the philosophy of science because the author not at all seems to be in touch with the state of the art of contemporary philosophy of science. Above all, we question the universalist undercurrent that Schwarz's 'bio-psycho-social model' of human judgment boils down to. In contrast to such position, we close our commentary with a plea for a context- and culture sensitive philosophy of science.
Ruck
Nora
N
Faculty of Psychology, Department of Psychological Basic Research, University of Vienna, Liebiggasse 5, 1010, Vienna, Austria. nora.ruck@univie.ac.at
Slunecko
Thomas
T
D003469:Culture; D006801:Humans; D010684:Philosophy; D011584:Psychology; D011593:Psychology, Social; D012586:Science