title: Effective usage of credit records promotes cooperation on weighted networks.
abstract: The cooperative behaviors of players on weighted networks are investigated by incorporation of trust mechanisms into a well-accepted game model, i.e., the networked prisoner's dilemma game, afterwards some weight-updating schemes are designed according to the credit records. Despite the differences in network topologies and strategy updating protocols, a simple yet significant principle surfaces that, to promote the emergence of cooperation over abundant weighted networks, only the latest credit record of partners is required to be taken into consideration, whereas incorporating more previous records may even deteriorate the cooperation performance. To support such an appealing principle, we have investigated more deeply into the role of credit records so as to give a detailed explanation underlying it. The virtue of this work lies in providing insights into the effective usage of the currently available credit records.
authors.affiliation: Key Laboratory of Image Processing and Intelligent Control, Department of Control Science & Engineering, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430074, People's Republic of China.
authors.forename: Chao
authors.initials: C
authors.lastname: Zhai
authors.forename: Hai-Tao
authors.initials: HT
authors.lastname: Zhang
authors.forename: Yang
authors.initials: Y
authors.lastname: Zhao
authors.forename: Michael Z Q
authors.initials: MZ
authors.lastname: Chen
authors.forename: Zhi-Hai
authors.initials: ZH
authors.lastname: Rong
authors.forename: Bing-Hong
authors.initials: BH
authors.lastname: Wang
mesh_terms: D000465:Algorithms; D003198:Computer Simulation; D003299:Cooperative Behavior; D005717:Games, Experimental; D006801:Humans; D008568:Memory; D035502:Trust