title: Gaming of performance measurement in health care: parallels with tax compliance.
abstract: Gaming of performance measurement in health care distorts performance, making it appear better than it is. This can conceal potentially hazardous practice and endanger patients and staff. Research has investigated and categorized this behaviour but as yet has offered little in the way of potential solutions as the drivers are still not well understood. Studies of the psychology of tax behaviour, specifically tax avoidance and evasion, reveal some insights into what the underlying causes are. Looking at health care and tax compliance, seven similarities in response can be detected: negative view of those subject to it; not salient except for specific classes of people; general understanding of the need versus resentment of actuality; cognitive dissonance; moral versus legal grey areas; two levels of objective non-compliance; and four categories of subjective behaviour and attitude. We suggest a model of reaction and compliance for gaming and offer some suggestions as to how this phenomenon might be minimized.
authors.affiliation: Care Quality Commission, London, UK. alex.mears@cqc.org.uk
authors.forename: Alex
authors.initials: A
authors.lastname: Mears
authors.forename: Paul
authors.initials: P
authors.lastname: Webley
mesh_terms: D002983:Clinical Competence; D003695:Delivery of Health Care / Q000592:standards*; D004739:England; D006291:Health Policy; D006801:Humans; D009014:Morals; D019984:Quality Indicators, Health Care; D013222:State Medicine; D013660:Taxes / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence*