When do we simulate non-human agents? Dissociating communicative and non-communicative actions.
There is strong evidence that we automatically simulate observed behavior in our motor system. Previous research suggests that this simulation process depends on whether we observe a human or a non-human agent. Measuring a motor priming effect, this study investigated the question of whether agent-sensitivity of motor simulation depends on the specific action observed. Participants saw pictures depicting end positions of different actions on a screen. All postures featured either a human or non-human agent. Participants had to produce the matching action with their left or right hand depending on the hand presented on the screen. Three different actions were displayed: a communicative action (emblem), a transitive (goal-directed) action and an intransitive action. We found motor priming effects of similar size for human and non-human agents for transitive and intransitive actions. However, the motor priming effect for communicative actions was present for the human agent, but absent for the non-human agent. These findings suggest that biological tuning of motor simulation is highly action-selective and depends on whether the observed behavior appears to be driven by a reasonable goal.
Liepelt
Roman
R
Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Department of Psychology, Leipzig, Germany. liepelt@cbs.mpg.de
Prinz
Wolfgang
W
Brass
Marcel
M
D000328:Adult; D003142:Communication; D003463:Cues; D005260:Female; D005385:Fingers / Q000502:physiology; D005868:Gestures; D006801:Humans; D008297:Male; D009068:Movement / Q000502:physiology*; D010775:Photic Stimulation; D011597:Psychomotor Performance / Q000502:physiology; D011930:Reaction Time / Q000502:physiology; D055815:Young Adult