title: Normative ethics does not need a foundation: it needs more science.
abstract: The impact of science on ethics forms since long the subject of intense debate. Although there is a growing consensus that science can describe morality and explain its evolutionary origins, there is less consensus about the ability of science to provide input to the normative domain of ethics. Whereas defenders of a scientific normative ethics appeal to naturalism, its critics either see the naturalistic fallacy committed or argue that the relevance of science to normative ethics remains undemonstrated. In this paper, we argue that current scientific normative ethicists commit no fallacy, that criticisms of scientific ethics contradict each other, and that scientific insights are relevant to normative inquiries by informing ethics about the options open to the ethical debate. Moreover, when conceiving normative ethics as being a nonfoundational ethics, science can be used to evaluate every possible norm. This stands in contrast to foundational ethics in which some norms remain beyond scientific inquiry. Finally, we state that a difference in conception of normative ethics underlies the disagreement between proponents and opponents of a scientific ethics. Our argument is based on and preceded by a reconsideration of the notions naturalistic fallacy and foundational ethics. This argument differs from previous work in scientific ethics: whereas before the philosophical project of naturalizing the normative has been stressed, here we focus on concrete consequences of biological findings for normative decisions or on the day-to-day normative relevance of these scientific insights.
authors.affiliation: Department of Philosophy and Moral Sciences, Research Unit 'The Moral Brain', Ghent University, Blandijnberg 2, 9000 Ghent, Belgium. katinka.quintelier@UGent.be
authors.forename: Katinka
authors.initials: K
authors.lastname: Quintelier
authors.forename: Linda
authors.initials: L
authors.lastname: Van Speybroeck
authors.forename: Johan
authors.initials: J
authors.lastname: Braeckman
mesh_terms: D028663:Ethical Theory; D006801:Humans; D012586:Science / Q000941:ethics*
references.citation: Horm Behav. 2002 Dec;42(4):399-413
references.pmid: 12488107
references.citation: Physiol Behav. 2009 Mar 23;96(4-5):613-9
references.pmid: 19150451
references.citation: Hum Nat. 2002 Sep;13(3):327-44
references.pmid: 26192926
references.citation: Child Dev. 1991 Aug;62(4):647-70
references.pmid: 1935336
references.citation: J Med Philos. 1990 Apr;15(2):143-59
references.pmid: 2351891
references.citation: Horm Behav. 1997 Apr;31(2):145-58
references.pmid: 9154435
references.citation: Ethology. 2009 Mar;115(3):257-263
references.pmid: 22267884
references.citation: Evol Hum Behav. 2000 Mar 1;21(2):79-95
references.pmid: 10785345