Remembering in contradictory minds: disjunction fallacies in episodic memory.
Disjunction fallacies have been extensively studied in probability judgment. They should also occur in episodic memory, if remembering a cue's episodic state depends on how its state is described on a memory test (e.g., being described as a target vs. as a distractor). If memory is description-dependent, cues will be remembered as occupying logically impossible combinations of episodic states (e.g., as being a target and a distractor). Consistent with this idea, memory disjunction fallacies were repeatedly detected in a series of experiments, at the level of individuals as well as at the level of groups. Disjunction fallacies varied as a function of manipulations that should affect description-dependency, such as type of test cue, immediate versus delayed testing, word frequency, and emotional valence. Response bias, as well as description-dependency, contributed to disjunction fallacies, as predicted by fuzzy-trace theory's retrieval model. The significance of these findings for memory is that a new form of episodic distortion, description-dependent memory, has been added to the 2 traditional forms (forgetting and false memory). The significance for probability judgment is that disjunction fallacies, which have customarily been explained as by-products of memory retrieval, may be wholly or partly due to the uncontrolled influence of response bias.
Brainerd
C J
CJ
Department of Human Development, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853, USA. cb299@cornell.edu
Reyna
V F
VF
Aydin
C
C
D000328:Adult; D001288:Attention / Q000502:physiology; D003463:Cues; D005260:Female; D006801:Humans; D007600:Judgment / Q000502:physiology*; D008297:Male; D011939:Mental Recall / Q000502:physiology*; D011582:Psychological Theory; D021641:Recognition, Psychology / Q000502:physiology*; D012153:Retention, Psychology / Q000502:physiology*