Oil and water: mixing individual mandates, fragmented markets, and health reform.
The 2010 federal health insurance reform act includes an individual mandate that will require Americans to carry health insurance. This article argues that even if the mandate were to catalyze universal health insurance coverage, it will fall short on some of the policy objectives many hope to achieve through a mandate if implemented in a fragmented insurance market. To uncover this problem, this article sets forth a novel framework that disentangles three different policy objectives the individual mandate can serve. Namely, supporters of the mandate might hope for it to: (1) facilitate greater health and financial security for the uninsured ("paternalism"); (2) eliminate inefficiencies in health care delivery and financing ("efficiency"); and/or (3) require the healthy to buy insurance to help fund medical care for the sick ("health redistribution"). Health redistribution--the primary focus of this article--is a shifting of wealth from the healthy to the sick through the mechanism of risk pooling. Many see health redistribution as a means to enable all Americans to more equitably access medical care on the basis of need, rather than on the basis of ability or willingness to pay. Drawing on evidence from the implementation of an individual mandate in Massachusetts's health reform in 2006, this article reveals that the fragmented American health insurance market will thwart the mandate's ability to achieve these objectives- in particular the goal of health redistribution. Fragmentation is an atomization of the insurance market into numerous risk pools that has been driven by market competition and regulation. It prevents Americans from sharing broadly in the risk of poor health and, in doing so, entrenches a system where access to medical care remains tied to ability to pay and individualized characteristics. The final section of this article examines how various policies, including some in the new law (e.g., insurance regulation and exchanges) and others not (e.g., expanded public insurance), can reduce fragmentation so that the mandate can successfully serve all desired objectives and in the process gain greater legitimacy over time.
Hoffman
Allison K
AK
Harvard Law School, Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology and Bioethics, USA.
D017598:Efficiency, Organizational; D018166:Health Care Reform; D019981:Health Care Sector / Q000458:organization & administration; D006801:Humans; D007348:Insurance, Health / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence / Q000458:organization & administration*; D037141:Mandatory Programs / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence*; D017146:Models, Organizational; D026706:Paternalism; D012935:Social Justice; D014481:United States; D019472:Universal Health Insurance / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence*