title: Ethics and the generous ontology.
abstract: According to a view attractive to both metaphysicians and ethicists, every period in a person's life is the life of a being just like that person except that it exists only during that period. These "subpeople" appear to have moral status, and their interests seem to clash with ours: though it may be in some person's interests to sacrifice for tomorrow, it is not in the interests of a subperson coinciding with him only today, who will never benefit from it. Or perhaps there is no clash, and a subperson's interests derive from those of the person it coincides with. But this makes it likely that our own interests derive from those of other beings coinciding with us.
authors.affiliation: Department of Philosophy, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, S3 7QB, UK. e.olson@shef.ac.uk
authors.forename: Eric T
authors.initials: ET
authors.lastname: Olson
mesh_terms: D026688:Bioethical Issues; D016265:Conflict of Interest; D026689:Ethical Analysis; D006801:Humans; D008037:Linguistics; D028681:Moral Obligations; D028723:Personhood; D012649:Self Concept