Are prototypes and exemplars used in distinct cognitive processes?
We argue that Machery provides no convincing evidence that prototypes and exemplars are typically used in distinct cognitive processes. This partially undermines the fourth tenet of the Heterogeneity Hypothesis and thus casts doubts on Machery's way of splitting concepts into different kinds. Although Machery may be right that concepts split into different kinds, such kinds may be different from those countenanced by the Heterogeneity Hypothesis.
Virtel
James
J
Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri-St. Louis, St. Louis, MO 63121-4400, USA. jlv4z3@umsl.edu
Piccinini
Gualtiero
G
D003071:Cognition / Q000502:physiology*; D003210:Concept Formation / Q000502:physiology*; D006801:Humans; D011582:Psychological Theory