title: Are prototypes and exemplars used in distinct cognitive processes?
abstract: We argue that Machery provides no convincing evidence that prototypes and exemplars are typically used in distinct cognitive processes. This partially undermines the fourth tenet of the Heterogeneity Hypothesis and thus casts doubts on Machery's way of splitting concepts into different kinds. Although Machery may be right that concepts split into different kinds, such kinds may be different from those countenanced by the Heterogeneity Hypothesis.
authors.affiliation: Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri-St. Louis, St. Louis, MO 63121-4400, USA. jlv4z3@umsl.edu
authors.forename: James
authors.initials: J
authors.lastname: Virtel
authors.forename: Gualtiero
authors.initials: G
authors.lastname: Piccinini
mesh_terms: D003071:Cognition / Q000502:physiology*; D003210:Concept Formation / Q000502:physiology*; D006801:Humans; D011582:Psychological Theory