Whistles, bells, and cogs in machines: Thomas Huxley and epiphenomenalism.
In this paper I try to shed some historical light upon the doctrine of epiphenomenalism, by focusing on the version of epiphenomenalism championed by Thomas Huxley, which is often treated as a classic statement of the doctrine. I argue that it is doubtful if Huxley held any form of metaphysical epiphenomenalism, and that he held a more limited form of empirical epiphenomenalism with respect to consciousness but not with respect to mentality per se. Contrary to what is conventionally supposed, Huxley's empirical epiphenomenalism with respect to consciousness was not simply based upon the demonstration of the neurophysiological basis of conscious mentality, or derived from the extension of mechanistic and reflexive principles of explanation to encompass all forms of animal and human behavior, but was based upon the demonstration of purposive and coordinated animal and human behavior in the absence of consciousness. Given Huxley's own treatment of mentality, his characterization of animals and humans as "conscious automata" was not well chosen.
Greenwood
John
J
Universities of Edinburgh and Oxford.
D003243:Consciousness; D049672:History, 19th Century; D049673:History, 20th Century; D006801:Humans; D008678:Metaphysics / Q000266:history*; D009482:Neurophysiology / Q000266:history; D010684:Philosophy / Q000266:history*; D010827:Physiology / Q000266:history; D011582:Psychological Theory; D011643:Publishing / Q000266:history; D012586:Science / Q000266:history