title: Animalism and the varieties of conjoined twinning.
abstract: We defend the view that we are not identical to organisms against the objection that it implies that there are two subjects of every conscious state one experiences: oneself and one's organism. We then criticize animalism--the view that each of us is identical to a human organism--by showing that it has unacceptable implications for a range of actual and hypothetical cases of conjoined twinning: dicephalus, craniopagus parasiticus, and cephalopagus.
authors.affiliation: Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, 1 Seminary Place, New Brunswick, NJ 08901, USA. tlcamp@eden.rutgers.edu
authors.forename: Tim
authors.initials: T
authors.lastname: Campbell
authors.forename: Jeff
authors.initials: J
authors.lastname: McMahan
mesh_terms: D000015:Abnormalities, Multiple; D026688:Bioethical Issues; D003243:Consciousness; D026689:Ethical Analysis; D018594:Human Body; D040821:Human Characteristics; D006801:Humans; D028681:Moral Obligations; D028723:Personhood; D014428:Twins, Conjoined