Is it wrong to impose the harms of human life? A reply to Benatar.
Might it be morally wrong to procreate? David Benatar answers affirmatively in Better Never to Have Been, arguing that coming into existence is always a great harm. I counter this view in several ways. First, I argue against Benatar's asserted asymmetry between harm and benefit--which would support the claim that any amount of harm in a human life would make it not worth starting--while questioning the significance of his distinction between a life worth starting and one worth continuing. I further contend that his understanding of hedonism and desire-fulfillment theories distorts their implications for the quality of human life; as for objective-list theories, I rebut his critique of their human-centered basis of evaluation. Notwithstanding this multi-tiered challenge to Benatar's reasoning, I conclude with praise for his work and the intellectual virtues it embodies.
DeGrazia
David
D
Department of Philosophy, George Washington University, Phillips 525, 801 22nd Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20052, USA. ddd@gwu.edu
D033421:Beginning of Human Life / Q000941:ethics*; D026689:Ethical Analysis; D006801:Humans; D028681:Moral Obligations; D010684:Philosophy; D011788:Quality of Life / Q000523:psychology; D012098:Reproduction / Q000941:ethics*; D015974:Wrongful Life / Q000941:ethics