Beyond the internalism/externalism debate: the constitution of the space of perception.
This paper tackles the problem of the nature of the space of perception. Based both on philosophical arguments and on results obtained from original experimental situations, it attempts to show how space is constituted concretely, before any distinction between the "inner" and the "outer" can be made. It thus sheds light on the presuppositions of the well-known debate between internalism and externalism in the philosophy of mind; it argues in favor of the latter position, but with arguments that are foundationally antecedent to this debate. We call the position we defend enactive externalism. It is based on experimental settings which, in virtue of their minimalism, make it possible both to defend a sensori-motor/enactive theory of perception; and, especially, to inquire into the origin of the space of perception, showing how it is concretely enacted before the controversy between internalism and externalism can even take place.
Lenay
Charles
C
UTC, Compiègne University of Technology, EA 2223 COSTECH (Knowledge, Organisation and Technical Systems) / CRED (Cognitive Research and Enaction Design), France. Charles.Lenay@utc.fr
Steiner
Pierre
P
D001364:Awareness; D001766:Blindness / Q000523:psychology; D004215:Distance Perception; D006801:Humans; D007389:Internal-External Control; D007699:Kinesthesis; D009949:Orientation; D011340:Problem Solving; D011434:Proprioception; D011597:Psychomotor Performance; D011601:Psychophysics; D012153:Retention, Psychology; D012683:Sensory Deprivation; D013028:Space Perception; D013236:Stereognosis; D014110:Touch