title: Bribery in health care in Uganda.
abstract: I examine the role of household permanent income in determining who bribes and how much they bribe in health care in Uganda. I find that rich patients are more likely than other patients to bribe in public health care: doubling household expenditure increases the bribery probability by 1.2 percentage points compared to a bribery rate of 17%. The income elasticity of the bribe amount is about 0.37. Bribes in the Ugandan public sector appear to be fees-for-service extorted from the richer patients amongst those exempted by government policy from paying the official fees. Bribes in the private sector appear to be flat-rate fees paid by patients who do not pay official fees. I do not find evidence that the public health care sector is able to price discriminate less effectively than public institutions with less competition from the private sector.
authors.affiliation: McGill University, Canada. jennifer.hunt@mcgill.ca
authors.forename: Jennifer
authors.initials: J
authors.lastname: Hunt
mesh_terms: D000328:Adult; D004465:Economic Competition; D005249:Fees and Charges; D005260:Female; D019981:Health Care Sector / Q000191:economics*; D005102:Health Expenditures / Q000706:statistics & numerical data; D006801:Humans; D007182:Income / Q000706:statistics & numerical data; D008297:Male; D017149:Private Sector / Q000191:economics*; D011369:Professional-Patient Relations; D017150:Public Sector / Q000191:economics*; D012940:Social Problems / Q000191:economics*; D014454:Uganda