Animal suffering should not trump environmental stewardship.
Andrew Linzey contends that our treatment of children should act as a model for our treatment of animals: just as we use our power to prevent the suffering of children, so should we restrict our behavior to protect animals from human-originated suffering. While not ignoring the role theology and emotion play in his ethical view, Linzey endeavors to provide a rational argument for the moral consideration of animals. In addition, Linzey explains how humans have created institutions to help them justify the continuance of animal suffering, followed by a plan to replace those institutions with animal-friendly ones. Linzey then applies his thinking to three contemporary institutions he believes cause animal suffering in an unjustifiable manner, namely hunting with dogs, fur farming, and commercial sealing. This review offers a detailed account of several significant weaknesses of Linzey's argument, ranging from the theological to the scientific, that should be considered before adopting his views.
Vantassel
Stephen M
SM
School of Natural Resources, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, and King's Evangelical Divinity School (Distance Learning Office), Kent, United Kingdom. svantassel2@unl.edu
D017087:Animal Rights; D000818:Animals; D026688:Bioethical Issues; D002835:Christianity; D004777:Environment; D006801:Humans; D009014:Morals; D010146:Pain / Q000209:etiology / Q000523:psychology; D013315:Stress, Psychological / Q000209:etiology / Q000523:psychology