Norms and customs: causally important or causally impotent?
In this article, I argue that norms and customs, despite frequently being described as being causes of behavior in the social sciences and ordinary conversation, cannot really cause behavior. Terms like "norms" and the like seem to refer to philosophically disreputable disjunctive properties. More problematically, even if they do not, or even if there can be disjunctive properties after all, I argue that norms and customs still cannot cause behavior. The social sciences would be better off without referring to properties like norms and customs as if they could be causal.
Jones
Todd
T
University of Nevada, Las Vegas.
D000846:Anniversaries and Special Events; D000884:Anthropology, Cultural / Q000193:education / Q000266:history; D002562:Ceremonial Behavior; D003466:Cultural Characteristics; D018864:Cultural Diversity; D049673:History, 20th Century; D049674:History, 21st Century; D008568:Memory; D010684:Philosophy / Q000266:history; D012919:Social Behavior; D012922:Social Change / Q000266:history; D012942:Social Sciences / Q000193:education / Q000266:history