title: The economics of priority review vouchers.
abstract: Priority review vouchers (PRVs) were introduced in 2007 by the US Congress as an incentive mechanism to spur pharmaceutical firms' R&D efforts for neglected diseases (NDs). A voucher, which a firm can obtain upon approval of a new treatment for NDs, entitles the holder to prioritize the FDA review for any drug. The proposal generated much controversy regarding its ability to effectively stimulate R&D for NDs. Here, after reviewing the main issues of the debate, i use a stylized economic model to discuss the strength of PRVs as an economic incentive to invest in research. My findings suggest that R&D investments might be higher when the developer could prioritize a valuable compound.
authors: Faculty of Economics, University of Siena, 53100, Italy. dimitri@unisi.it
authors: Nicola
authors: N
authors: Dimitri
mesh_terms: D035843:Biomedical Research / Q000191:economics*; D017277:Drug Approval / Q000191:economics*; D004345:Drug Industry / Q000191:economics*; D006801:Humans; D007449:Investments / Q000191:economics; D018803:Models, Economic; D058069:Neglected Diseases / Q000191:economics*; D009965:Orphan Drug Production / Q000191:economics*; D010330:Patents as Topic; D014481:United States; D014486:United States Food and Drug Administration