title: Asymmetric interaction will facilitate the evolution of cooperation.
abstract: Explaining the evolution of cooperation remains one of the greatest problems for both biology and social science. The classical theories of cooperation suggest that cooperation equilibrium or evolutionary stable strategy between partners can be maintained through genetic similarity or reciprocity relatedness. These classical theories are based on an assumption that partners interact symmetrically with equal payoffs in a game of cooperation interaction. However, the payoff between partners is usually not equal and therefore they often interact asymmetrically in real cooperative systems. With the Hawk-Dove model, we find that the probability of cooperation between cooperative partners will depend closely on the payoff ratio. The higher the payoff ratio between recipients and cooperative actors, the greater will be the probability of cooperation interaction between involved partners. The greatest probability of conflict between cooperative partners will occur when the payoff between partners is equal. The results show that this asymmetric relationship is one of the key dynamics of the evolution of cooperation, and that pure cooperation strategy (i.e., Nash equilibrium) does not exist in asymmetrical cooperation systems, which well explains the direct conflict observed in almost all of the well documented cooperation systems. The model developed here shows that the cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation is also negatively correlated with the probability of cooperation interaction. A smaller cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation might be created by the limited dispersal ability or exit cost of the partners involved, and it will make the punishment of the non-cooperative individuals by the recipient more credible, and therefore make it more possible to maintain stable cooperation interaction.
authors.affiliation: State Key Laboratory of Genetic Resources and Evolution, Kunming Institute of Zoology, Chinese Academy of Science, Kunming, China. ruiwukiz@hotmail.com
authors.forename: RuiWu
authors.initials: R
authors.lastname: Wang
authors.forename: JunZhou
authors.initials: J
authors.lastname: He
authors.forename: YaQiang
authors.initials: Y
authors.lastname: Wang
authors.forename: Lei
authors.initials: L
authors.lastname: Shi
authors.forename: YaoTang
authors.initials: Y
authors.lastname: Li
mesh_terms: D005075:Biological Evolution; D008962:Models, Theoretical; D011336:Probability