title: Predicting behavior in economic games by looking through the eyes of the players.
abstract: Social scientists often rely on economic experiments such as ultimatum and dictator games to understand human cooperation. Systematic deviations from economic predictions have inspired broader conceptions of self-interest that incorporate concerns for fairness. Yet no framework can describe all of the major results. We take a different approach by asking players directly about their self-interest--defined as what they want to do (pleasure-maximizing options). We also ask players directly about their sense of fairness--defined as what they think they ought to do (fairness-maximizing options). Player-defined measures of self-interest and fairness predict (a) the majority of ultimatum-game and dictator-game offers, (b) ultimatum-game rejections, (c) exiting behavior (i.e., escaping social expectations to cooperate) in the dictator game, and (d) who cooperates more after a positive mood induction. Adopting the players' perspectives of self-interest and fairness permits better predictions about who cooperates, why they cooperate, and when they punish noncooperators.
authors.affiliation: Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720, USA. mellers@haas.berkeley.edu
authors.forename: Barbara A
authors.initials: BA
authors.lastname: Mellers
authors.forename: Michael P
authors.initials: MP
authors.lastname: Haselhuhn
authors.forename: Philip E
authors.initials: PE
authors.lastname: Tetlock
authors.forename: José C
authors.initials: JC
authors.lastname: Silva
authors.forename: Alice M
authors.initials: AM
authors.lastname: Isen
mesh_terms: D000328:Adult; D000339:Affect / Q000502:physiology*; D002755:Choice Behavior / Q000502:physiology; D005260:Female; D005717:Games, Experimental; D040821:Human Characteristics; D006801:Humans; D007398:Interpersonal Relations; D008297:Male; D012919:Social Behavior