title: Public goods games with reward in finite populations.
abstract: Public goods games paraphrase the problem of cooperation in game theoretical terms. Cooperators contribute to a public good and thereby increase the welfare of others at a cost to themselves. Defectors consume the public good but do not pay its cost and therefore outperform cooperators. Hence, according to genetic or cultural evolution, defectors should be favored and the public good disappear - despite the fact that groups of cooperators are better off than groups of defectors. The maximization of short term individual profits causes the demise of the common resource to the detriment of all. This outcome can be averted by introducing incentives to cooperate. Negative incentives based on the punishment of defectors efficiently stabilize cooperation once established but cannot initiate cooperation. Here we consider the complementary case of positive incentives created by allowing individuals to reward those that contribute to the public good. The finite-population stochastic dynamics of the public goods game with reward demonstrate that reward initiates cooperation by providing an escape hatch out of states of mutual defection. However, in contrast to punishment, reward is unable to stabilize cooperation but, instead, gives rise to a persistent minority of cooperators.
authors.affiliation: Department of Mathematics, University of British Columbia, 1984 Mathematics Road, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z2, Canada.
authors.forename: Peter A I
authors.initials: PA
authors.lastname: Forsyth
authors.forename: Christoph
authors.initials: C
authors.lastname: Hauert
mesh_terms: D000818:Animals; D003299:Cooperative Behavior; D005716:Game Theory; D006801:Humans; D015233:Models, Statistical; D009042:Motivation; D011157:Population Dynamics; D011678:Punishment