The illogicality of stock-brokers: psychological experiments on the effects of prior knowledge and belief biases on logical reasoning in stock trading.
BACKGROUND
Explanations for the current worldwide financial crisis are primarily provided by economists and politicians. However, in the present work we focus on the psychological-cognitive factors that most likely affect the thinking of people on the economic stage and thus might also have had an effect on the progression of the crises. One of these factors might be the effect of prior beliefs on reasoning and decision-making. So far, this question has been explored only to a limited extent.


METHODS
We report two experiments on logical reasoning competences of nineteen stock-brokers with long-lasting vocational experiences at the stock market. The premises of reasoning problems concerned stock trading and the experiments varied whether or not their conclusions--a proposition which is reached after considering the premises--agreed with the brokers' prior beliefs. Half of the problems had a conclusion that was highly plausible for stock-brokers while the other half had a highly implausible conclusion.


RESULTS
The data show a strong belief bias. Stock-brokers were strongly biased by their prior knowledge. Lowest performance was found for inferences in which the problems caused a conflict between logical validity and the experts' belief. In these cases, the stock-brokers tended to make logically invalid inferences rather than give up their existing beliefs.


CONCLUSIONS
Our findings support the thesis that cognitive factors have an effect on the decision-making on the financial market. In the present study, stock-brokers were guided more by past experience and existing beliefs than by logical thinking and rational decision-making. They had difficulties to disengage themselves from vastly anchored thinking patterns. However, we believe, that it is wrong to accuse the brokers for their "malfunctions", because such hard-wired cognitive principles are difficult to suppress even if the person is aware of them.
Experimental Psychology and Cognitive Science, Justus Liebig University Giessen, Giessen, Germany. markus.knauff@psychol.uni-giessen.de
Markus
M
Knauff
Claudia
C
Budeck
Ann G
AG
Wolf
Kai
K
Hamburger
D000704:Analysis of Variance; D006801:Humans; D007449:Investments; D019359:Knowledge