Why should we respect the privacy of donors of biological material?
Why should we respect the privacy of donors of biological material? The question is answered in the present article in general philosophical terms from the point of view of an ethics of honour, a libertarian theory of rights, a view of respect for privacy based on the idea that autonomy is of value in itself, and utilitarianism respectively. For different reasons the ethics of honour and the idea of the value of autonomy are set to one side. It surfaces that the moral rights theory and utilitarianism present conflicting answers to the question. The main thrust of the argument is that there is no way of finding an overlapping consensus, so politicians have to take decisions that are bound to be controversial in that they can be questioned on reasonable philosophical grounds.
Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University, 106 91, Stockholm, Sweden. torbjorn.tannsjo@philosophy.su.se
Torbjörn
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D003219:Confidentiality / Q000941:ethics*; D053803:Forensic Genetics / Q000941:ethics; D005796:Genes / Q000941:ethics; D006801:Humans; D007258:Informed Consent / Q000941:ethics* / Q000592:standards; D010067:Ownership / Q000941:ethics; D026684:Personal Autonomy; D014019:Tissue Donors / Q000941:ethics*