Designing the financial tools to promote universal access to AIDS care.
We argue that reluctance to invest in drug treatments to fight the AIDS epidemics in developing countries is largely motivated by severe losses occurring from the future albeit uncertain appearance of a curative vaccine. We design a set of securities generating full insurance coverage against such losses, while achieving full risk-sharing with vaccine development agencies. In a General Equilibrium framework, we show that those securities are demanded to improve social welfare in developing countries, to increase current investment in treatments and the provision of public goods. Even though designed for AIDS, those securities can also be applied to other epidemics such as malaria and tuberculosis, as well as any innovative treatment to fight orphan diseases.
Euromed Management, Domaine de Luminy, Marseille, France. Patrick.Leoni@euromed-management.com
Patrick
P
Leoni
Stéphane
S
Luchini
D016915:AIDS Vaccines / Q000191:economics; D000163:Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome / Q000191:economics* / Q000628:therapy*; D003906:Developing Countries; D004345:Drug Industry / Q000191:economics; D058872:Epidemics; D005380:Financing, Government; D005602:France; D006297:Health Services Accessibility / Q000191:economics*; D006801:Humans; D019458:Insurance Coverage / Q000191:economics*; D020414:Risk Sharing, Financial; D014481:United States
D016915:AIDS Vaccines