Wide variation in hospital and physician payment rates evidence of provider market power.
Wide variation in private insurer payment rates to hospitals and physicians across and within local markets suggests that some providers, particularly hospitals, have significant market power to negotiate higher-than-competitive prices, according to a new study by the Center for Studying Health System Change (HSC). Looking across eight health care markets--Cleveland; Indianapolis; Los Angeles; Miami; Milwaukee; Richmond, Va.; San Francisco; and rural Wisconsin--average inpatient hospital payment rates of four large national insurers ranged from 147 percent of Medicare in Miami to 210 percent in San Francisco. In extreme cases, some hospitals command almost five times what Medicare pays for inpatient services and more than seven times what Medicare pays for outpatient care. Variation within markets was just as dramatic. For example, the hospital with prices at the 25th percentile of Los Angeles hospitals received 84 percent of Medicare rates for inpatient care, while the hospital with prices at the 75th percentile received 184 percent of Medicare rates. The highest-priced Los Angeles hospital with substantial inpatient claims volume received 418 percent of Medicare. While not as pronounced, significant variation in physician payment rates also exists across and within markets and by specialty. Few would characterize the variation in hospital and physician payment rates found in this study to be consistent with a highly competitive market. Purchasers and public policy makers can address provider market power, or the ability to negotiate higher-than-competitive prices, through two distinct approaches. One is to pursue market approaches to strengthen competitive forces, while the other is to constrain payment rates through regulation.
Paul B
PB
Ginsburg
D004465:Economic Competition / Q000191:economics*; D005245:Fee Schedules / Q000191:economics*; D005251:Fees, Medical; D005377:Financial Management, Hospital / Q000191:economics*; D033161:Government Regulation; D006801:Humans; D007297:Inpatients; D007348:Insurance, Health / Q000191:economics*; D006278:Medicare / Q000191:economics; D017008:Negotiating; D010045:Outpatients; D010820:Physicians / Q000191:economics*; D017149:Private Sector / Q000191:economics*; D011445:Prospective Payment System / Q000191:economics*; D011907:Rate Setting and Review / Q000379:methods; D014481:United States