Expertise, wisdom and moral philosophers: a response to Gesang.
In a recent issue of Bioethics, Bernard Gesang asks whether a moral philosopher possesses greater moral expertise than a non-philosopher, and his answer is a qualified yes, based not so much on his infallible access to the truth, but on the quality of his theoretically-informed moral justifications. I reject Gesang's claim that there is such a thing as moral expertise, although the moral philosopher may well make a valid contribution to the ethics committee as a concerned and educated citizen. I suggest that wisdom is a lot more interesting to examine than moral expertise. Again, however, moral philosophers have no monopoly on wisdom, and the study of philosophy may even impede its cultivation.
School of Philosophy in University College Dublin, Dublin 4, Ireland. Christopher.cowley@ucd.ie
Christopher
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Cowley
D026822:Ethicists; D017041:Ethics Committees; D005065:Euthanasia / Q000941:ethics; D006801:Humans; D007600:Judgment; D011361:Professional Competence; D024382:Professional Role; D012941:Social Responsibility; D057905:Stem Cell Research / Q000941:ethics