title: [Pay for performance (P4P). Long-term effects and perspectives].
abstract: After 10 years of experience and research, a wide array of results on evaluation and long-term effects of pay for performance (P4P) programs have been published. These data do not only give insight into most of the problems of implementation, but also into aspects which, in part, may attenuate the high expectations at the beginning of the discussion. P4P programs exhibit a ceiling effect, some improvements are reversed after incentives are cancelled, and improvements show opportunity costs as absent improvements for indicators, which are not object to financial incentives (in some cases for the same disease). These observations can be explained by the hypothesis that P4P programs have characteristics of fee-for-service reimbursement, if symmetric information is available for insurance and provider. P4P programs are local instruments. While integration of healthcare is considered as an important issue, they should be combined with programs and incentives which foster further vertical and horizontal integration. For Germany, further research in the implementation and effects of P4P programs is necessary.
authors.affiliation: Institut für Patientensicherheit, Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, Stiftsplatz 12, Bonn, Germany. matthias.schrappe@ukb.uni-bonn.de
authors.forename: M
authors.initials: M
authors.lastname: Schrappe
authors.forename: N
authors.initials: N
authors.lastname: Gültekin
mesh_terms: D003695:Delivery of Health Care / Q000191:economics* / Q000639:trends*; D005858:Germany; D011785:Quality Assurance, Health Care / Q000191:economics* / Q000639:trends*; D012052:Reimbursement, Incentive / Q000191:economics* / Q000639:trends*