title: Specifying the self for cognitive neuroscience.
abstract: Cognitive neuroscience investigations of self-experience have mainly focused on the mental attribution of features to the self (self-related processing). In this paper, we highlight another fundamental, yet neglected, aspect of self-experience, that of being an agent. We propose that this aspect of self-experience depends on self-specifying processes, ones that implicitly specify the self by implementing a functional self/non-self distinction in perception, action, cognition and emotion. We describe two paradigmatic cases - sensorimotor integration and homeostatic regulation - and use the principles from these cases to show how cognitive control, including emotion regulation, is also self-specifying. We argue that externally directed, attention-demanding tasks, rather than suppressing self-experience, give rise to the self-experience of being a cognitive-affective agent. We conclude with directions for experimental work based on our framework.
authors.affiliation: Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, 2136 West Mall, Vancouver, BC V6T1Z4, Canada.
authors.forename: Kalina
authors.initials: K
authors.lastname: Christoff
authors.forename: Diego
authors.initials: D
authors.lastname: Cosmelli
authors.forename: Dorothée
authors.initials: D
authors.lastname: Legrand
authors.forename: Evan
authors.initials: E
authors.lastname: Thompson
mesh_terms: D001288:Attention; D003071:Cognition / Q000502:physiology*; D056228:Feedback, Sensory; D006801:Humans; D009488:Neurosciences; D010465:Perception / Q000502:physiology*; D012647:Self-Assessment