title: Does the rejection of wrongful life claims rely on a conceptual error?
abstract: There are four major arguments raised against wrongful life claims: first, that it is impossible to establish harm in wrongful life claims; second, that wrongful life claims are illogical or incoherent; third, that life is inviolable and sacred no matter the quality; and fourth, that there are no rights and duties towards non-existent persons. In this paper, I will examine and evaluate critically the first two arguments. I will reject these objections against wrongful life claims and demonstrate that they rely on a conceptual error/mistake. In doing so, I will reject the logic of comparing existence with non-existence in wrongful life claims. Instead, I will maintain that recognition of the infant's cause of action and recognition of the infant's harmed condition need not imply any preference for non-existence over existence, and it need not to be so severe as to make life not worth living. I will conclude by briefly giving an account of what seems to me to be the right conception of what it is to be harmed.
authors.affiliation: CESP/iSEI/School of Law, University of Manchester, Williamson Building, Oxford Road, Manchester, UK. paul.muriithi@postgrad.manchester.ac.uk
authors.forename: Paul Mutuanyingi
authors.initials: PM
authors.lastname: Muriithi
mesh_terms: D035881:Compensation and Redress / Q000941:ethics* / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence; D000013:Congenital Abnormalities / Q000235:genetics*; D030342:Genetic Diseases, Inborn / Q000235:genetics*; D006806:Human Rights; D006801:Humans; D016365:Liability, Legal; D010684:Philosophy; D011788:Quality of Life / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence; D026712:Value of Life; D015974:Wrongful Life / Q000941:ethics*