title: Strong's objections to the future of value account.
abstract: According to Carson Strong, the future of value account of the wrongness of killing is subject to counterexamples. Ezio Di Nucci has disagreed. Their disagreement turns on whether the concepts of a future of value and a future like ours are equivalent. Unfortunately, both concepts are fuzzy, which explains, at least in part, the disagreement. I suggest that both concepts can be clarified in ways that seem plausible and that makes them equivalent. Strong claims that better accounts of the wrongness of killing exist. I show that those alternative accounts are unsatisfactory.
authors.affiliation: Department of Philosophy, The University of Kansas, 1445 Jayhawk Blvd., Lawrence, KS 66045, USA. dmarquis@ku.edu
authors.forename: Don
authors.initials: D
authors.lastname: Marquis
mesh_terms: D000028:Abortion, Induced / Q000941:ethics*; D033421:Beginning of Human Life / Q000941:ethics*; D005260:Female; D006708:Homicide / Q000941:ethics*; D006801:Humans; D008297:Male; D028723:Personhood; D011247:Pregnancy; D026712:Value of Life