title: The rise of empirical research in medical ethics: a MacIntyrean critique and proposal.
abstract: Hume's is/ought distinction has long limited the role of empirical research in ethics, saying that data about what something is cannot yield conclusions about the way things ought to be. However, interest in empirical research in ethics has been growing despite this countervailing principle. We attribute some of this increased interest to a conceptual breakdown of the is/ought distinction. MacIntyre, in reviewing the history of the is/ought distinction, argues that is and ought are not strictly separate realms but exist in a close relationship that is clarified by adopting a teleological orientation. We propose that, instead of recovering a teleological orientation, society tends to generate its own goals via democratic methods like those described by Rousseau or adopt agnosticism about teleology such as described by Richard Rorty. In both latter scenarios, the distinction between is and ought is obscured, and the role for empirical research grows, but for controversial reasons. MacIntyre warns that the is/ought distinction should remain, but reminds ethicists to make careful arguments about when and why it is legitimate to move from is to ought.
authors.affiliation: Columbia University Medical Center, Department of Psychiatry, New York State Psychiatric Institute, 1051 Riverside Drive, Box 103, New York, NY 10032, USA. rlawrence@uchicago.edu
authors.forename: Ryan E
authors.initials: RE
authors.lastname: Lawrence
authors.forename: Farr A
authors.initials: FA
authors.lastname: Curlin
mesh_terms: D036262:Empirical Research; D004992:Ethics, Medical; D006801:Humans; D009014:Morals; D010686:Philosophy, Medical