title: Naïve realism without disjunctivism about experience.
abstract: I argue that the possibility of non-perceptual experience need not compel a naïve realist to adopt a disjunctive conception of experience. Instead, they can maintain that the nature of perceptual and hallucinatory experience is the same, while still claiming that perceptual experience is presentational of the objects of perception. On such a view the difference between perceptual and non-perceptual experience will lie in the nature of the objects that are so presented. I will defend a view according to which in non-perceptual experience one is presented with mere universals, while in perceptual experience one is presented with the instantiation of a universal by a particular. This is to adopt disjunctivism about the objects of experience, about that which is apparently present in experience.
authors.affiliation: Department of Philosophy, Durham University, 50 Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP, UK. m.d.conduct@durham.ac.uk
authors.forename: Matthew
authors.initials: M
authors.lastname: Conduct
mesh_terms: D001364:Awareness; D003243:Consciousness; D006212:Hallucinations / Q000523:psychology; D006801:Humans; D010465:Perception; D011582:Psychological Theory; D014796:Visual Perception