title: The concept possession hypothesis of self-consciousness.
abstract: This paper presents the hypothesis that concept possession is sufficient and necessary for self-consciousness. If this is true it provides a yardstick for gauging the validity of different research paradigms in which claims for self-consciousness in animals or human infants are made: a convincing demonstration of concept possession in a research subject, such as a display of inferential reasoning, may be taken as conclusive evidence of self-consciousness. Intuitively, there appears to be a correlation between intelligence in animals (which presupposes concept possession) and the existence of self-consciousness. I present three discussions to support the hypothesis: an analogy between perception and conception, where both are self-specifying; an argument that any web of concepts will always include the self-concept; and a fresh interpretation of Bermũdez (1998) showing how his theory of non-conceptual content provides strong support for the concept possession hypothesis.
authors: Macquarie Centre for Cognitive Science (MACCS), Macquarie University, Sydney NSW 2109, Australia. Stephane.savanah@gmail.com
authors: Stephane
authors: S
authors: Savanah
mesh_terms: D000818:Animals; D001364:Awareness; D003210:Concept Formation; D003243:Consciousness; D006801:Humans; D007360:Intelligence; D010465:Perception; D010802:Phylogeny; D011582:Psychological Theory; D012649:Self Concept