title: Evolutionary games defined at the network mesoscale: the Public Goods game.
abstract: The evolutionary dynamics of the Public Goods game addresses the emergence of cooperation within groups of individuals. However, the Public Goods game on large populations of interconnected individuals has been usually modeled without any knowledge about their group structure. In this paper, by focusing on collaboration networks, we show that it is possible to include the mesoscopic information about the structure of the real groups by means of a bipartite graph. We compare the results with the projected (coauthor) and the original bipartite graphs and show that cooperation is enhanced by the mesoscopic structure contained. We conclude by analyzing the influence of the size of the groups in the evolutionary success of cooperation.
authors: Departamento de Matemática Aplicada, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, 28933 Móstoles, Madrid, Spain. gardenes@gmail.com
authors: Jesús
authors: J
authors: Gmez-Gardeñes
authors: Miguel
authors: M
authors: Romance
authors: Regino
authors: R
authors: Criado
authors: Daniele
authors: D
authors: Vilone
authors: Angel
authors: A
authors: Sánchez
mesh_terms: D005075:Biological Evolution; D003299:Cooperative Behavior; D005716:Game Theory; D008954:Models, Biological