title: Understanding is not simulating: a reply to Gibbs and Perlman.
abstract: In this response, I do four things. First, I defend the claim that the action compatibility effect does not distinguish between embodied and traditional accounts of language comprehension. Second, I present neuroimaging and neuropsychological results that seem to support the traditional account. Third. I argue that metaphorical language poses no special challenge to the arguments I gave against embodied theories of comprehension. Fourth, I lay out the architecture of language I advocate and suggest the sorts of data that would decide between traditional and embodied accounts.
authors.affiliation: Department of Philosophy, Georgia State University, P.O. Box 4089, Atlanta, GA 30302, USA. dweiskopf@gsu.edu
authors.forename: Daniel A
authors.initials: DA
authors.lastname: Weiskopf
mesh_terms: D003071:Cognition; D032882:Comprehension; D006801:Humans; D007802:Language; D008037:Linguistics