title: Harris, harmed states, and sexed bodies.
abstract: This paper criticises John Harris's attempts to defend an account of a 'harmed condition' that can stand independently of intuitions about what is 'normal'. I argue that because Homo sapiens is a sexually dimorphic species, determining whether a particular individual is in a harmed condition or not will sometimes require making reference to the normal capacities of their sex. Consequently, Harris's account is unable to play the role he intends for it in debates about the ethics of human enhancement.
authors.affiliation: Centre for Human Bioethics, School of Philosophical, Historical, and International Studies, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria 3800, Australia. robert.sparrow@arts.monash.edu.au
authors.forename: Robert
authors.initials: R
authors.lastname: Sparrow
mesh_terms: D026688:Bioethical Issues; D003657:Decision Making / Q000941:ethics*; D005260:Female; D030342:Genetic Diseases, Inborn / Q000517:prevention & control*; D024861:Genetic Enhancement / Q000941:ethics*; D006801:Humans; D008297:Male; D043762:Reproductive Behavior / Q000941:ethics*; D012945:Social Values