title: Phase diagrams for the spatial public goods game with pool punishment.
abstract: The efficiency of institutionalized punishment is studied by evaluating the stationary states in the spatial public goods game comprising unconditional defectors, cooperators, and cooperating pool punishers as the three competing strategies. Fines and costs of pool punishment are considered as the two main parameters determining the stationary distributions of strategies on the square lattice. Each player collects a payoff from five five-person public goods games, and the evolution of strategies is subsequently governed by imitation based on pairwise comparisons at a low level of noise. The impact of pool punishment on the evolution of cooperation in structured populations is significantly different from that reported previously for peer punishment. Representative phase diagrams reveal remarkably rich behavior, depending also on the value of the synergy factor that characterizes the efficiency of investments payed into the common pool. Besides traditional single- and two-strategy stationary states, a rock-paper-scissors type of cyclic dominance can emerge in strikingly different ways.
authors.affiliation: Research Institute for Technical Physics and Materials Science, Post Office Box 49, H-1525 Budapest, Hungary.
authors.forename: Attila
authors.initials: A
authors.lastname: Szolnoki
authors.forename: György
authors.initials: G
authors.lastname: Szabó
authors.forename: Matjaž
authors.initials: M
authors.lastname: Perc
mesh_terms: D003299:Cooperative Behavior; D003365:Costs and Cost Analysis; D005716:Game Theory; D009010:Monte Carlo Method; D011678:Punishment