title: Explanatory pluralism in cognitive science.
abstract: This brief commentary has three goals. The first is to argue that "framework debate" in cognitive science is unresolvable. The idea that one theory or framework can singly account for the vast complexity and variety of cognitive processes seems unlikely if not impossible. The second goal is a consequence of this: We should consider how the various theories on offer work together in diverse contexts of investigation. A final goal is to supply a brief review for readers who are compelled by these points to explore existing literature on the topic. Despite this literature, pluralism has garnered very little attention from broader cognitive science. We end by briefly considering what it might mean for theoretical cognitive science.
authors.affiliation: Department of Psychology, University of Memphis Department of Philosophy, Binghamton University Scientific and Philosophical Studies of Mind Program, Psychology Department, Franklin and Marshall College.
authors.forename: Rick
authors.initials: R
authors.lastname: Dale
authors.forename: Eric
authors.initials: E
authors.lastname: Dietrich
authors.forename: Anthony
authors.initials: A
authors.lastname: Chemero