title: Space perception and William James's metaphysical presuppositions.
abstract: William James's overtly philosophical work may be more continuous with his psychological work than is sometimes thought. His Essays in Radical Empiricism can be understood as an explicit statement of the absolute presupposition that formed the basis of Jamesian psychology: that direct experience is primary and has to be taken at face value. An examination of James's theory of space perception suggests that, even in his early work, he presupposed the primacy of direct experience, and that later changes in his account of space perception can be understood as making his view more consistent with this presupposition. In his earlier view of space perception, James argued that sensations were directly experienced as spatial, though he accepted that spatial relations between sensations may be constructed by higher order thought. In his later view, however, James argued that spatial relations were just as directly experienced as sensations. The work of T. H. Green may have prompted James to recognize the full consequence of his ideas and to realize that taking experience at face value required that spatial relations be thought of as intrinsic to experience rather than the result of intellectual construction.
authors.affiliation: School of Psychological Sciences, University of Manchester, Manchester, United Kingdom. martin.farrell@manchester.ac.uk
authors.forename: Martin J
authors.initials: MJ
authors.lastname: Farrell
mesh_terms: D019348:Empiricism / Q000266:history*; D049672:History, 19th Century; D049673:History, 20th Century; D006801:Humans; D008678:Metaphysics / Q000266:history*; D011584:Psychology / Q000266:history*; D013028:Space Perception; D014481:United States