title: Human dignity, biolaw, and the basis of moral community.
abstract: This paper argues that the concept of human dignity, as currently contested, offers no clear guidance to lawmakers. Within the "bioethical triangle", human dignity has a quite different significance depending upon whether one is a utilitarian, a human rights theorist, or a dignitarian. Having rejected the possibility of an easy accommodation between these views, it is suggested that we should conceive of human dignity as a precondition for (any form of) moral community--specifically, a setting in which humans try to do the right thing and accept responsibility for their freely chosen actions. If lawmakers re-focus on human dignity in this way, they will have some important guidance in the face of a raft of emerging technologies.
authors.affiliation: TELOS, King's College London.
authors.forename: Roger
authors.initials: R
authors.lastname: Brownsword
mesh_terms: D026688:Bioethical Issues / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence*; D006806:Human Rights; D006801:Humans; D007258:Informed Consent; D009014:Morals; D028723:Personhood