title: The myth of phenomenological overflow.
abstract: In this paper I examine the dispute between Hakwan Lau, Ned Block, and David Rosenthal over the extent to which empirical results can help us decide between first-order and higher-order theories of consciousness. What emerges from this is an overall argument to the best explanation against the first-order view of consciousness and the dispelling of the mythological notion of phenomenological overflow that comes with it.
authors.affiliation: CUNY LaGuardia, 31-10 Thompson Ave., Long Island City, NY 11101, USA. onemorebrown@gmail.com
authors.forename: Richard
authors.initials: R
authors.lastname: Brown
mesh_terms: D001364:Awareness; D003243:Consciousness; D036262:Empirical Research; D006801:Humans; D010465:Perception; D011582:Psychological Theory