title: Emergence of heterogeneity in a noncompetitive resource allocation problem.
abstract: Tuning one's shower in some hotels may turn into a challenging coordination game with imperfect information. The temperature sensitivity increases with the number of agents, making the problem possibly unlearnable. Because there is in practice a finite number of possible tap positions, identical agents are unlikely to reach even approximately their favorite water temperature. We show that a population of agents with homogeneous strategies is evolutionary unstable, which gives insights into the emergence of heterogeneity, the latter being tempting but risky.
authors.affiliation: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, Department of Economics, University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany. christina.matzke@uni-bonn.de
authors.forename: Christina
authors.initials: C
authors.lastname: Matzke
authors.forename: Damien
authors.initials: D
authors.lastname: Challet