title: Internal organs, integral selves, and good communities: opt-out organ procurement policies and the 'separateness of persons'.
abstract: Most people accept that if they can save someone from death at very little cost to themselves, they must do so; call this the 'duty of easy rescue.' At least for many such people, an instance of this duty is to allow their vital organs to be used for transplantation. Accordingly, 'opt-out' organ procurement policies, based on a powerfully motivated responsibility to render costless or very low-cost lifesaving aid, would seem presumptively permissible. Counterarguments abound. Here I consider, in particular, objections that assign a moral distinctiveness to the physical boundaries of our bodies and that concern autonomy and trust. These objections are singled out as they seem particularly pertinent to the stress I place on a distinctive benefit of the particular policy I defend. An opt-out system, resting not on the authority of 'presumed consent' but on the recognition of a duty to one another, has the prospect of prompting people to understand more richly the ways in which they are both physically embodied and communally embedded.
authors.affiliation: Department of Philosophy and Center for Ethics and Humanities in Life Science, Michigan State University, 324 Linton Hall, East Lansing, MI 48824, USA. jlnelson@msu.edu
authors.forename: James Lindemann
authors.initials: JL
authors.lastname: Nelson
mesh_terms: D003068:Coercion; D028663:Ethical Theory; D006801:Humans; D028681:Moral Obligations; D028701:Patient Rights / Q000941:ethics*; D026684:Personal Autonomy; D019724:Presumed Consent / Q000941:ethics*; D012941:Social Responsibility; D014019:Tissue Donors / Q000941:ethics / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence / Q000600:supply & distribution; D009927:Tissue and Organ Procurement / Q000941:ethics*; D035502:Trust; D014481:United States