title: Rational choice and the political bases of changing Israeli counterinsurgency strategy.
abstract: Israeli counterinsurgency doctrine holds that the persistent use of credible threat and disproportionate military force results in repeated victories that eventually teach the enemy the futility of aggression. The doctrine thus endorses classical rational choice theory's claim that narrow cost-benefit calculations shape fixed action rationales. This paper assesses whether Israel's strategic practice reflects its counterinsurgency doctrine by exploring the historical record and the association between Israeli and Palestinian deaths due to low-intensity warfare. In contrast to the expectations of classical rational choice theory, the evidence suggests that institutional, cultural and historical forces routinely override simple cost-benefit calculations. Changing domestic and international circumstances periodically cause revisions in counterinsurgency strategy. Credible threat and disproportionate military force lack the predicted long-term effect.
authors: Department of Sociology, University of Toronto, Canada. rbrym@chass.utoronto.ca
authors: Robert J
authors: RJ
authors: Brym
authors: Robert
authors: R
authors: Andersen
mesh_terms: D018912:Arabs; D002755:Choice Behavior; D049673:History, 20th Century; D049674:History, 21st Century; D006801:Humans; D007557:Israel; D015233:Models, Statistical; D011057:Politics; D014857:Warfare