title: [Pay for performance explained by transaction costs theory].
abstract: OBJECTIVE
  To evaluate the ability of transaction costs theory to explain incentives in the health care chain.
  
  
  METHODS
  We performed a case study of CPS, a health insurance company in Bogota (Colombia), which preferred not to publish its name.
  
  
  RESULTS
  CPS moves in the environment of high transaction costs and uses the hybrid form of governance at the outpatient level. Incentive intensity, administrative control and the contract all agree with the theory. At the hospital level, the market is used, despite greater uncertainty. Because of the discrete form (1.0) of the incentives and the absence of administrative control, it is difficult for CPS to relate payment to hospital performance.
  
  
  CONCLUSIONS
  Transaction costs theory explains the configuration of incentives. Another contribution made by this theory to the literature is the criterion to differentiate between the market and the hybrid. We propose that the market uses discrete-type (1.0) incentives, while the hybrid uses continuous, commission-like incentives.
authors.affiliation: Departamento de Administración de Salud, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Administrativas, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Bogotá, Colombia. yurigor@javeriana.edu.co
authors.forename: Yuri
authors.initials: Y
authors.lastname: Gorbaneff
authors.forename: Ariel
authors.initials: A
authors.lastname: Cortes
authors.forename: Sergio
authors.initials: S
authors.lastname: Torres
authors.forename: Francisco
authors.initials: F
authors.lastname: Yepes
mesh_terms: D000553:Ambulatory Care / Q000191:economics; D003105:Colombia; D003365:Costs and Cost Analysis; D006760:Hospitalization / Q000191:economics; D007343:Insurance Carriers / Q000191:economics*; D007348:Insurance, Health / Q000191:economics*; D018803:Models, Economic; D012052:Reimbursement, Incentive / Q000191:economics*