title: What are self-generated actions?
abstract: The concept of self-generated action is controversial, despite extensive study of its neural basis. Why is this concept so troublesome? We analyse the concept of self-generated action as employed by Passingham, Bengtsson, and Lau (2010a, 2010b). There are two definitions of self-generated action; as operant action and as underdetermined action. The latter draws on subjective experience. Experiments on action awareness suggest that experience may not be a good guide for defining self-generated action. Nevertheless, we agree with Passingham and colleagues that self-generated actions exist distinct from operant actions. But defining 'self-generated' by the degree of involvement of an endogenous process risks regress. We sketch an alternative account of self-generated action that tries to avoid these problems to make self-generated actions accessible to experimental science.
authors.affiliation: Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, 17 Queen Square, London WC1N 3AR, UK. F.schuur@ucl.ac.uk
authors.forename: Friederike
authors.initials: F
authors.lastname: Schüür
authors.forename: Patrick
authors.initials: P
authors.lastname: Haggard
mesh_terms: D001364:Awareness; D001519:Behavior; D001921:Brain / Q000033:anatomy & histology / Q000502:physiology; D003463:Cues; D003657:Decision Making; D006801:Humans; D007389:Internal-External Control