title: Payment contracts in a preventive health care system: a perspective from operations management.
abstract: We consider a health care system consisting of two noncooperative parties: a health purchaser (payer) and a health provider, where the interaction between the two parties is governed by a payment contract. We determine the contracts that coordinate the health purchaser-health provider relationship; i.e. the contracts that maximize the population's welfare while allowing each entity to optimize its own objective function. We show that under certain conditions (1) when the number of customers for a preventive medical intervention is verifiable, there exists a gate-keeping contract and a set of concave piecewise linear contracts that coordinate the system, and (2) when the number of customers is not verifiable, there exists a contract of bounded linear form and a set of incentive-feasible concave piecewise linear contracts that coordinate the system.
authors: Edward P. Fitts Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC 27695-7906, USA. reza.yaesoubi@gmail.com
authors: Reza
authors: R
authors: Yaesoubi
authors: Stephen D
authors: SD
authors: Roberts
mesh_terms: D015179:Colorectal Neoplasms / Q000175:diagnosis / Q000191:economics* / Q000517:prevention & control; D003284:Contract Services / Q000458:organization & administration*; D032982:Contracts / Q000191:economics*; D003695:Delivery of Health Care / Q000458:organization & administration*; D006301:Health Services Needs and Demand / Q000191:economics; D006801:Humans; D007348:Insurance, Health / Q000191:economics*; D008403:Mass Screening; D015233:Models, Statistical; D011314:Preventive Health Services / Q000191:economics*