Market conditions and general practitioners' referrals.
We study how market conditions influence referrals of patients by general practitioners (GPs). We set up a model of GP referral for the Norwegian health care system, where a GP receives capitation payment based on the number of patients in his practice, as well as fee-for-service reimbursements. A GP may accept new patients or close the practice to new patients. We model GPs as partially altruistic, and compete for patients. We show that a GP operating in a more competitive market has a higher referral rate. To compete for patients and to retain them, a GP satisfies patients' requests for referrals. Furthermore, a GP who faces a patient shortage will refer more often than a GP who does not. Tests with Norwegian GP radiology referral data support our theory.
Department of Health Management and Health Economics, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway. tor.iversen@medisin.uio.no
Tor
T
Iversen
Ching-to Albert
CT
Ma
D002204:Capitation Fee; D003657:Decision Making; D004465:Economic Competition; D018588:Fee-for-Service Plans / Q000191:economics; D005260:Female; D058005:General Practitioners / Q000191:economics* / Q000592:standards; D006801:Humans; D007345:Insurance Claim Review; D008297:Male; D008875:Middle Aged; D018803:Models, Economic; D009664:Norway; D010818:Practice Patterns, Physicians' / Q000191:economics*; D011871:Radiology / Q000191:economics / Q000706:statistics & numerical data; D012017:Referral and Consultation / Q000191:economics* / Q000592:standards