Cheating monkeys undermine group strength in enemy territory.
In many social animals, group-mates cooperate to defend their range against intrusion by neighboring groups. Because group size tends to be highly variable, such conflicts are often asymmetric. Although numerical superiority is assumed to provide a competitive advantage, small groups can generally defend their ranges, even when greatly outnumbered. The prevailing explanation for this puzzling phenomenon is that individuals in relatively large groups experience a greater temptation to flee from conflicts, in effect leveling the balance of power. Using playback experiments simulating territorial intrusions by wild capuchin monkey (Cebus capucinus) groups, we show that such a collective action problem does indeed undermine the competitive ability of large groups. Focal capuchins were more likely to run away from territorial intrusions when their group had a numeric advantage; each one-individual increase in relative group size raised the odds of flight by 25%. However, interaction location had a more important impact on individuals' reactions, creating a strong home-field advantage. After controlling for relative group size, the odds that a focal animal fled were 91% lower in experiments that occurred in the center compared with on the edge of its group's range, whereas the odds that it rushed toward the speaker were more than sixfold higher. These location-dependent patterns of defection and cooperation create a competitive advantage for residents over intruders across a wide range of relative group sizes, which may stabilize range boundaries and provide a general explanation for how groups of widely divergent sizes can coexist, even in the face of intense intergroup competition.
Smithsonian Tropical Research Institute, Balboa, Ancón, Panamá, Republic of Panama. crofootm@si.edu
Margaret Chatham
MC
Crofoot
Ian C
IC
Gilby
D000161:Acoustic Stimulation; D000374:Aggression; D000818:Animals; D002428:Cebus / Q000502:physiology*; D003299:Cooperative Behavior; D008192:Deception; D006126:Group Processes; D016015:Logistic Models; D019370:Observation; D010176:Panama; D013731:Territoriality