Non-visual consciousness and visual images in blindsight.
In a recent response paper to Brogaard (2011a), Morten Overgaard and Thor Grünbaum argue that my case for the claim that blindsight subjects are not visually conscious of the stimuli they correctly identify rests on a mistaken necessary criterion for determining whether a conscious experience is visual or non-visual. Here I elaborate on the earlier argument while conceding that the question of whether blindsight subjects are visually conscious of the visual stimuli they correctly identify largely is an empirical question. I conclude by sketching a method for testing whether blindsight subjects have visual consciousness of stimuli presented to them in their blind field.
UMSL, Department of Philosophy, Center for Neurodynamics, Lucas Hall, St. Louis, MO 63121, USA. brogaardb@gmail.com
Berit
B
Brogaard
D006801:Humans; D014474:Unconsciousness / Q000503:physiopathology*; D014796:Visual Perception