title: In the lab and the field: punishment is rare in equilibrium.
abstract: I argue that field (experimental) studies on (costly) peer punishment in social dilemmas face the problem that in equilibrium punishment will be rare and therefore may be hard to observe in the field. I also argue that the behavioral logic uncovered by lab experiments is not fundamentally different from the behavioral logic of cooperation in the field.
authors.affiliation: School of Economics, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD, United Kingdom. simon.gaechter@nottingham.ac.uk
authors.forename: Simon
authors.initials: S
authors.lastname: Gächter
mesh_terms: D003299:Cooperative Behavior; D005716:Game Theory; D006801:Humans; D008960:Models, Psychological; D011678:Punishment / Q000523:psychology*; D012919:Social Behavior