title: Reciprocity and uncertainty.
abstract: Guala points to a discrepancy between strong negative reciprocity observed in the lab and the way cooperation is sustained "in the wild." This commentary suggests that in lab experiments, strong negative reciprocity is limited when uncertainty exists regarding the players' actions and the intentions. Thus, costly punishment is indeed a limited mechanism for sustaining cooperation in an uncertain environment.
authors.affiliation: Department of Psychology, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer Sheva 84105, Israel. Yoella@bgu.ac.il
authors.forename: Yoella
authors.initials: Y
authors.lastname: Bereby-Meyer
mesh_terms: D003299:Cooperative Behavior; D005716:Game Theory; D006801:Humans; D008960:Models, Psychological; D011678:Punishment / Q000523:psychology*; D012919:Social Behavior