title: The social structure of cooperation and punishment.
abstract: The standard theories of cooperation in humans, which depend on repeated interaction and reputation effects among self-regarding agents, are inadequate. Strong reciprocity, a predisposition to participate in costly cooperation and the punishment, fosters cooperation where self-regarding behaviors fail. The effectiveness of socially coordinated punishment depends on individual motivations to participate, which are based on strong reciprocity motives. The relative infrequency of high-cost punishment is a result of the ubiquity of strong reciprocity, not its absence.
authors.affiliation: Santa Fe Institute, Santa Fe, NM 87501, USA. hgintis@comcast.net
authors.forename: Herbert
authors.initials: H
authors.lastname: Gintis
authors.forename: Ernst
authors.initials: E
authors.lastname: Fehr
mesh_terms: D003299:Cooperative Behavior; D005716:Game Theory; D006801:Humans; D008960:Models, Psychological; D011678:Punishment / Q000523:psychology*; D012919:Social Behavior