title: Lab support for strong reciprocity is weak: punishing for reputation rather than cooperation.
abstract: Strong reciprocity is not the only account that can explain costly punishment in the lab; it can also be explained by reputation-based accounts. We discuss these two accounts and suggest what kinds of evidence would support the two different alternatives. We conclude that the current evidence favors a reputation-based account of costly punishment.
authors.affiliation: Department of Psychology, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06511, USA. Alex.Shaw@yale.edu
authors.forename: Alex
authors.initials: A
authors.lastname: Shaw
authors.forename: Laurie
authors.initials: L
authors.lastname: Santos
mesh_terms: D003299:Cooperative Behavior; D005716:Game Theory; D006801:Humans; D008960:Models, Psychological; D011678:Punishment / Q000523:psychology*; D012919:Social Behavior