title: On delayed discrete evolutionary dynamics.
abstract: We examine the asymptotic stability of equilibria where individuals react to delayed information and the delays are heterogeneously distributed. For symmetric games with binary actions, we derive conditions under which the stability/instability of equilibria does not depend on the delay distribution. As a corollary, we show that a unique mixed evolutionarily stable state in games in well-mixed populations is asymptotically stable under a class of delayed replicator dynamics, for any lag distribution.
authors.affiliation: Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA. riijima@fas.harvard.edu
authors.forename: Ryota
authors.initials: R
authors.lastname: Iijima
mesh_terms: D000818:Animals; D005075:Biological Evolution; D005716:Game Theory; D008954:Models, Biological; D011157:Population Dynamics; D012919:Social Behavior; D013997:Time Factors