title: Punishing for your own good: the case of reputation-based cooperation.
abstract: Contrary to Guala, I claim that several mechanisms can explain punishment in humans. Here I focus on reputation-based cooperation--and I explore how it can lead to punishment under situations that may or may not be perceived as being anonymous. Additionally, no particular mechanism stands out in predicting an excess of punishment under constrained lab conditions.
authors.affiliation: Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, 04013 Leipzig, Germany. tennie@eva.mpg.de
authors.forename: Claudio
authors.initials: C
authors.lastname: Tennie
mesh_terms: D003299:Cooperative Behavior; D005716:Game Theory; D006801:Humans; D008960:Models, Psychological; D011678:Punishment / Q000523:psychology*; D012919:Social Behavior