title: Retaliation and antisocial punishment are overlooked in many theoretical models as well as behavioral experiments.
abstract: Guala argues that there is a mismatch between most laboratory experiments on costly punishment and behavior in the field. In the lab, experimental designs typically suppress retaliation. The same is true for most theoretical models of the co-evolution of costly punishment and cooperation, which a priori exclude the possibility of defectors punishing cooperators.
authors.affiliation: Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, 113 83 Stockholm, Sweden. anna.dreber@hhs.se
authors.forename: Anna
authors.initials: A
authors.lastname: Dreber
authors.forename: David G
authors.initials: DG
authors.lastname: Rand
mesh_terms: D003299:Cooperative Behavior; D005716:Game Theory; D006801:Humans; D008960:Models, Psychological; D011678:Punishment / Q000523:psychology*; D012919:Social Behavior