DNA synthesis security.
It is generally assumed that genetic engineering advances will, inevitably, facilitate the misapplication of biotechnology toward the production of biological weapons. Unexpectedly, however, some of these very advances in the areas of DNA synthesis and sequencing may enable the implementation of automated and nonintrusive safeguards to avert the illicit applications of biotechnology. In the case of DNA synthesis, automated DNA screening tools could be built into DNA synthesizers in order to block the synthesis of hazardous agents. In addition, a comprehensive safety and security regime for dual-use genetic engineering research could include nonintrusive monitoring of DNA sequencing. This is increasingly feasible as laboratories outsource this service to just a few centralized sequencing factories. The adoption of automated, nonintrusive monitoring and surveillance of the DNA synthesis and sequencing pipelines may avert many risks associated with dual-use biotechnology. Here, we describe the historical background and current challenges associated with dual-use biotechnologies and propose strategies to address these challenges.
Program on Science and Global Security Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, Washington, DC, USA. nouri@princeton.edu
Ali
A
Nouri
Christopher F
CF
Chyba
D001694:Biological Warfare / Q000517:prevention & control; D001709:Biotechnology / Q000191:economics / Q000941:ethics / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence / Q000592:standards*; D004247:DNA / Q000096:biosynthesis* / Q000737:chemistry / Q000235:genetics; D005818:Genetic Engineering / Q000191:economics / Q000941:ethics / Q000331:legislation & jurisprudence / Q000592:standards*; D009838:Oligodeoxyribonucleotides / Q000737:chemistry / Q000235:genetics; D020416:Outsourced Services; D012449:Safety; D017422:Sequence Analysis, DNA
D009838:Oligodeoxyribonucleotides; D004247:DNA