title: Evolutionarily stable strategy and invader strategy in matrix games.
abstract: In this paper, we consider the concepts of evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), neighborhood invader strategy (NIS) and global invader strategy (GIS) in single species with frequency-dependent interactions. We find some general relationships among the three concepts in matrix games. The main conclusion is that ESS and NIS are equivalent to each other and are both equivalent to local superiority; a strategy with global superiority must be a GIS; a GIS may not be equivalent to its global superiority in games with more than two players; and in any two-player matrix game a GIS is just equivalent to its global superiority. In two-player games, globally asymptotic stability in the replicator dynamics has also been shown. Equivalent conditions for the three concepts stated by payoff comparisons are given and are applied to examples involved.
authors.affiliation: Faculty of Science, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang, 212013, People's Republic of China. dgzw@ujs.edu.cn
authors.forename: Zhanwen
authors.initials: Z
authors.lastname: Ding
authors.forename: Shuxun
authors.initials: S
authors.lastname: Wang
authors.forename: Honglin
authors.initials: H
authors.lastname: Yang
mesh_terms: D000818:Animals; D005075:Biological Evolution; D005716:Game Theory; D056084:Genetic Fitness; D055641:Mathematical Concepts; D008954:Models, Biological; D011157:Population Dynamics; D012641:Selection, Genetic