title: Supercooperation in evolutionary games on correlated weighted networks.
abstract: In this work we study the behavior of classical two-person, two-strategies evolutionary games on a class of weighted networks derived from Barabási-Albert and random scale-free unweighted graphs. Using customary imitative dynamics, our numerical simulation results show that the presence of link weights that are correlated in a particular manner with the degree of the link end points leads to unprecedented levels of cooperation in the whole games' phase space, well above those found for the corresponding unweighted complex networks. We provide intuitive explanations for this favorable behavior by transforming the weighted networks into unweighted ones with particular topological properties. The resulting structures help us to understand why cooperation can thrive and also give ideas as to how such supercooperative networks might be built.
authors.affiliation: Information Systems Institute, Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Lausanne, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland. pierre.buesser@unil.ch
authors.forename: Pierre
authors.initials: P
authors.lastname: Buesser
authors.forename: Marco
authors.initials: M
authors.lastname: Tomassini
mesh_terms: D003299:Cooperative Behavior; D005716:Game Theory; D008962:Models, Theoretical