title: Representations in dynamical embodied agents: re-analyzing a minimally cognitive model agent.
abstract: Understanding the role of ''representations'' in cognitive science is a fundamental problem facing the emerging framework of embodied, situated, dynamical cognition. To make progress, I follow the approach proposed by an influential representational skeptic, Randall Beer: building artificial agents capable of minimally cognitive behaviors and assessing whether their internal states can be considered to involve representations. Hence, I operationalize the concept of representing as ''standing in,'' and I look for representations in embodied agents involved in simple categorization tasks. In a first experiment, no representation can be found, but the relevance of the task is undermined by the fact that agents with no internal states can reach high performance. A simple modification makes the task more "representationally hungry," and in this case, agents' internal states are found to qualify as representations. I conclude by discussing the benefits of reconciling the embodied-dynamical approach with the notion of representation.
authors.affiliation: Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, Rome, Italy. marco.mirolli@istc.cnr.it
authors.forename: Marco
authors.initials: M
authors.lastname: Mirolli
mesh_terms: D003071:Cognition; D006801:Humans; D008962:Models, Theoretical